Our security
We ask to run a binary on every host. Here is our own posture.
Agent inventory is sensitive: it reveals which teams run which AI tooling. Everything here is how we hold that, what is done, and what is honestly still planned. Sekeye will be pen-tested, and we will say so when it has been.
Transport. Today
TLS + Bearer API key on ingest. Per-endpoint enrolment tokens. Agent is read-only, pull-only. No inbound path into the fleet.
Transport. Hardening pass before GA
Mutual TLS between agent and backend, plus certificate pinning, landing with the self-host package. On the roadmap, said out loud.
Agent least-privilege
One binary, no separate privileged helper. It scans in user context, and runs as a supervised OS service where system-wide inventory is needed.
No secret values
Env values, file contents, browsing, and keystrokes are outside the ingest schema. Records containing them are rejected server-side.
Signed everything
Release binaries, update manifests, and catalog bundles are Ed25519-signed, and the agent verifies an update before applying it. Signed command delivery is part of the hardening pass before GA.
Own SBOM
A CycloneDX SBOM is emitted with every release. Signed provenance is planned. We ask you to trust a binary on every host, so we publish our own bill of materials.
SOC 2
SOC 2 is on the roadmap once design partners are in production. Type I to start, Type II afterwards. No claims until audited.